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Abstract
This paper examines the role of rising housing prices and borrowing constraints as deter-
minants of China’s high household saving rate, especially among young households. Using a
life-cycle model of saving behavior in the presence of borrowing constraints, we show that the
relationship between housing prices and saving exists only under certain conditions and for cer-
tain groups of households. Specifically, when the return on financial instruments is low (which
is the case in China), the saving rate of young households may increase with housing prices.
This relationship, moreover, is non-linear and depends on the level of wealth. Employing an
empirical strategy motivated by the theoretical model, we analyze a dataset of over six thousand
Chinese urban households spanning the years 1995, 2002 and 2007. We find evidence that higher
housing prices do in fact increase the saving rates of young households. We also find evidence
for the predicted non-linearity.
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1 Introduction
The particularly high household saving rates in China have attracted much attention among policy
makers and academics. In policy circles, high saving rates in emerging Asia are seen as a key factor
behind global imbalances, in which China appears to be a major player (Bernanke, 2005, 2006).
Meanwhile, concerns have been expressed about China’s high saving rates (and correspondingly
weak consumption), which can represent a potential threat to the Chinese economy itself by putting
China’s growth model off-balance (see in particular Yellen, 2011, Zhou, 2011, and repeated G20
communique´s).
Data from household surveys suggest that saving rates are especially high for young households
(Chamon and Prasad, 2010). Along with several other factors, high housing prices, together with
strong borrowing constraints, have been proposed as a possible explanation. First, house purchases
are part of saving so that, other things equal, higher prices could translate into larger saving. Sec-
ond, with strong borrowing constraints, young households need to save more prior to the purchase
in order to make the required down payment (Chamon and Prasad 2010, Wang and Wen 2012). At
first glance, this mechanism seems a promising explanation given the developments on the Chinese
housing market in the last twenty years. The privatization of urban housing started in the early
1990’s and was close to completion in the early 2000’s. A sizable appreciation of housing prices
took place during the same period and accelerated even further afterward. While appealing, this
potential link between housing prices and household savings is not as straightforward as it may
seem: if households have the choice between buying and renting a home, it is not obvious why they
should distort their saving behavior to become owners.
This paper aims at carefully studying the relationship between housing prices and the savings
behavior of young households in a context of strong borrowing constraints. Our contribution is
twofold. First, we build a life-cycle model and identify conditions under which there can indeed be
a positive relationship between housing prices and saving. Second, we bring the model to the data,
using the China Household Income Project (CHIP) surveys, a unique dataset of over six thousand
urban households. The CHIP survey provides data for 1995, 2002, and 2007, years that span the
period during which China’s urban housing privatization was fully implemented.
In the model, households live for three periods (young, middle age, and old). They receive
labor income in the first two periods but not the last one. We assume they can use two alternative
assets as saving instruments: financial assets (deposits) and real assets. While deposits have a
potentially lower rate of return, real assets are subject to a minimum investment requirement. A
typical example of such a real asset is an equity share in housing when homes have a minimum size
and the debt-to-value ratio is constrained. Using this framework, we show that the relationship
between housing prices and saving exists only under certain conditions and for certain groups of
households.
We first assume that the two assets have the same rate of return. Then, there is no systematic
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relationship between household saving and housing prices, even with strong borrowing constraints.
The reason is that households prefer to rent housing, rather than having to distort their saving
profile to buy a home. Next, we assume that deposits have a lower rate of return than real assets, a
feature that describes the Chinese economy well. With this assumption, households can be willing
to increase their saving rate when young, in order to accumulate enough wealth to purchase a
home in their middle age and enjoy the larger rate of return when old. In that case, saving rates
of young households are shown to be an increasing function of the housing price. Importantly, the
relationship between housing prices and saving rates of young households is found to be non-linear:
it only holds for households with intermediate levels of wealth, but not for very poor or very rich
households.
The model’s testable implication is that the saving rate of young households should be negatively
correlated with the ratio of income to housing prices for certain levels of wealth. In the empirical
exercise, we use the geographical variation of housing prices at the province level to test for this
mechanism. Our identification strategy consists of comparing households with different shares of
young members facing different real estate prices at the provincial level. Specifically, we interact the
income-to-housing price ratio with the share of young members in the household.1 If the mechanism
is present in the data, this interacted term should be negative. This identification strategy addresses
potential correlations between provincial housing prices and other variables likely to affect saving
behaviors.
Our result provides support for the mechanism described in the model. We do indeed find that
the interacted coefficient is negative, with estimated values statistically significant at conventional
levels for 1995 and 2007 (for 2002, the estimation is less accurate but the p-value is close to
10%). This result is robust to a variety of alternative specifications. We also find support for
the predicted non-linearity. When restricting the samples to wealth quartiles, we find that the
relationship only holds for lower levels of wealth, with statistically significant coefficients for all
three years. According to our results, a 50% increase in housing prices should be associated ceteris
paribus with a 10 percentage point increase of the saving rate of young individuals belonging to the
first quartile of the wealth distribution. We therefore conclude that house prices play a key role in
understanding the high Chinese saving rate.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3
presents key stylized facts on household saving in China, with reference to Chamon and Prasad
(2010). Section 4 presents our theoretical model of household saving. The empirical exercises are
carried out in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
1A large proportion of Chinese households are multi-generational.
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2 Review of the literature
The literature on savings in China has grown rapidly in recent years, much of it prompted by
China’s unusually high savings rates. Estimates of the average propensity to save by households
vary depending on the data used. National accounts flow of funds data yield aggregate savings
rates in the range of 20 to 25 percent in the early 1990s, rising to 30 percent in the late 1990s and
early 2000s and then increasing further to nearly 40 percent by 2008 (Ma and Yi 2010). Households
have contributed from 40 percent to 50 percent or more of aggregate savings, and studies based
on national accounts data report shares of household savings in GDP generally in the range of
17 to 23 percent (Ma and Yi 2010; Chamon and Prasad 2010, Yang, Zhang and Zhou 2011).
Household survey data yield lower average savings rates, but with similar upward trends. For
urban households, the focus of this paper, average savings rates calculated using household survey
data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) rose from 15-18 percent in the 1990s to 20
percent in the early 2000s, and further to over 25 percent in the late 2000s (Chamon and Prasad
2010; Yang, Zhang and Zhou 2011).
Explanations for China’s high household saving rates generally take the lifecycle hypothesis
(LCH) as a starting point. Several studies explicitly test the applicability of the LCH to China,
in some cases making comparisons with Keynesian models (Ang 2009, Horioka and Wan 2007,
Modigliani and Cao 2004). The LCH implies that household saving rates may be affected by
(anticipated) growth in per capita income, age or stage in the lifecycle, interest rates, and inflation.
Uncertainty about future income growth can create a motive for precautionary savings, and so
may also be relevant (Kraay 2000, Nabar 2011). Modigliani and Cao (2004), using estimates of
national savings based on aggregate asset data, and Horioka and Wan (2007), using provincial-level
aggregated household survey data, find that China’s high and increasing household savings rates
are largely explained by income growth and changes in demographic structure. Horioka and Wan
(2007) also reports evidence of behavioral inertia/persistence and identifies differences between
urban and rural savings behavior.
Kraay (2000) and Nabar (2011), both of which use provincial-level aggregated household survey
data, come to somewhat different conclusions. Kraay’s empirical results suggest that a standard
LCH model does not adequately explain Chinese household savings behavior. He suggests that
other factors, some unique to China, should be considered. In this regard he raises the importance
of measurement issues; credit constraints in conjunction with the need to save for purchases of
durables and lifecycle events; and precautionary saving associated with institutional changes and
the expansion of new and unpredictable markets in the process of China’s economic transition.
Nabar (2011) finds that the coefficients on income growth and income volatility are significant in
simple models, but that when controls are introduced for lagged savings rates (to capture behav-
ioral persistence), demographics, employment structure, and other variables, income growth and
volatility are no longer significant. In almost all cases, however, interest rates have a significant,
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negative coefficient, which he attributes to target savings behavior.
Recent studies have benefited from access to household-level data, which makes possible em-
pirical analysis of the micro foundations of savings in China using a wider range of explanatory
variables. Household-level data display not only high savings rates, but also a U-shaped house-
hold age-savings profile. Savings rates are higher for younger and older households, and lower for
middle-aged households (Chamon and Prasad 2010, Handelshøyskole 2011, Yang, Zhang and Zhou
2011). This contrasts with the standard hump-shaped age-savings profile implied by the LCH.
Explanations for the unusual pattern of household savings in China generally hinge on the
presence of imperfect or incomplete markets reflecting credit constraints, limited insurance options,
or specific policies and institutions. Some studies investigate the role of saving for retirement, which
has been affected by changes in pension policies and family structure (e.g., Ang 2009, Chamon,
Liu and Prasad 2010, Chamon and Prasad 2010, Feng, He and Sato 2011). Some look at the role
of precautionary savings, which may have increased following employment reforms and changes
in social safety net programs such as health and unemployment insurance (e.g., Baldacci et al.
2010, Barnett and Brooks 2010, Chamon and Prasad 2010, Meng 2003). Banerjee, Meng and
Qian (2010) and Wei and Zhang (2010) analyze the impact of lifecycle events such as marriage,
as influenced by China’s changing demographics and sex ratios in the wake of China’s family
planning policies. Several recent papers analyze the impact of housing wealth and homeownership
on household savings, especially in urban areas after the urban housing privatization and during a
period characterized by the rapid appreciation of housing prices (e.g., Chen, Funke and Mehrota
2011, Handelshøyskole 2011, Jin 2011, and Wang and Wen 2012). Finally, Coeurdacier et al. (2012)
argue that the abnormal U-shape pattern results from a measurement bias: young households are
likely to be individuals living on their own rather than staying with their parents, earning a higher
income, and therefore having a higher saving rate than average.
The relationship between housing and savings, the focus of this paper, is the topic of some studies
in the general economics literature. A simple LCH model predicts that an unanticipated increase in
housing prices will increase the consumption and thus reduce the savings of homeowners. Studies
using micro data generally find evidence in support of such a housing wealth effect. Engelhardt
(1996), for example, finds a significant effect for households that experience capital losses, but not
for households that experience capital gains, in housing. In a study of U.S. states and also across
countries, Case, Quigley and Shiller (2004) find evidence of a fairly large housing wealth effect on
consumption. Bostic et al. (2009), Campbell and Cocco (2007) and Chen, et al. (2007) report
evidence of differences in the housing wealth effect among wealth quartiles and also between younger
and older homeowners, households that are and are not credit constrained, and homeowners and
renters. These studies highlight the potential importance of heterogeneity among groups in the
population.
To date few papers have analyzed the relationship between housing wealth and savings (or
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consumption) in China. Most look at the urban sector since the mid- or late 1990s, the period
during which China’s urban housing privatization was completed and real estate markets became
more developed. Jin (2011) uses household data from Beijing to analyze the housing wealth effect
on consumption and finds a weak relationship. His study, however, is based on a small, nonrandom
sample from a single city. Chen, Funke and Mehrota (2011) examine the housing wealth effect
using a larger, city-level dataset and panel techniques. They report a positive and significant effect
of housing prices on consumption, i.e., housing price appreciation reduces savings. The effect is
stronger in cities where house prices have risen more quickly and have been more volatile. These
findings suggest that housing wealth effects in China resemble those elsewhere, but they imply
that China’s urban savings rates should be declining (because housing prices have been increasing).
Consequently, they do not solve the puzzle of China’s high and rising savings rates.
Credit constraints provide a key to the puzzle. In China credit markets are underdeveloped and
households’ ability to borrow to finance housing purchases is limited. Households therefore must
save to purchase housing. Moreover, the amount that households save will depend on the cost of
housing (Chamon and Prasad 2010, Handelshøyskole 2011, Wang and Wen 2012). If housing prices
increase relative to income, then households that wish to purchase a house (or help their children
purchase a house) will increase their savings rates. This mechanism may lead to heterogeneous
savings behavior between households that are and are not saving for the purchase of a home, thus
providing a possible explanation for China’s U shaped age-savings profile.
Analysis of the impact of credit constraints and housing purchases on household savings behavior
in China is as yet limited. A few papers that estimate LCH-type models of savings add control
variables for housing. Chamon and Prasad (2010), for example, include a dummy variable for
homeownership. Contrary to expectations, the coefficient on this dummy variable is positive or
not significantly different from zero. When they include interactions between the homeownership
dummy and five-year age ranges for the household head, however, they find the expected negative
relationship for younger age groups in recent years. Nabar (2011) uses city-level data to estimate an
LCH model and includes the city housing price level and housing price growth as control variables.
He finds that the level of the housing price has a positive and significant effect on household savings,
although growth in housing prices is not significant.2
While some progress has been made in the quest to better understand the relationship between
homeownership and savings in China, more work remains to be done. First, while the positive
relation between housing prices and household saving in the presence of credit constraints seems
appealing, theoretical work is needed to determine the conditions under which such a mecha-
nism really applies. Second, both the theoretical and empirical analysis of savings would benefit
from deliberate and explicit attention to heterogeneity in savings behavior. Third, access to new
household-level datasets, such as the CHIP survey data, makes possible a more complete, nuanced
2The issue of high house prices in China itself has attracted attention. For a recent analysis see Wei, Zhang and
Liu (2012), as well as the references therein, who focus on the role of status competition in explaining house prices.
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empirical analysis. Our aim in this paper is to make contributions in all these regards.
3 Stylized facts
In this section, we show that our data display patterns similar to those documented by earlier
works, e.g. Chamon and Prasad (2010), and explore how these patterns are affected by different
assumptions regarding the definition of the saving rate. We compute the age-profiles of the saving
rates using all three surveys, 1995, 2002, and 2007. Age profiles are built by averaging the saving
rate over households of a given age using a three-year moving average to smooth the resulting curve.
We start by replicating the methodology used by Chamon and Prasad (2010) to reproduce
their main finding (Figure 5. p. 103). As Chamon and Prasad (2010), we include durable goods
and education expenses in the definition of consumption when computing the saving rate. Our
methodology differs from theirs in two ways. First, our measures of income and consumption
include an estimation of imputed rents. Second, we define the age of the household as the age of
its member with the highest income, instead of the head of household. “Household head” is a self-
reported variable. In multi-generation households, an older parent may be listed as the household
head even though an adult child is the main income earner. In multi-generation households in the
CHIP data, the self-reported household heads are often older than the household member with the
highest income. We conclude that the age of the household head may not reflect well the stage in
the household’s lifecycle.
The resulting age profiles are plotted in Figure 4. Two observations stand out. First, the figure
clearly shows the large increase of saving rates between 1995 and 2007. Second, the age-profile does
not follow the inverted U-shape corresponding to the standard life-cycle. Of particular note, the
saving rates of young households continued to rise from 1995 to 2002 and again from 2002 to 2007,
by which time their saving rates were in the range of 20 to 30 percent and the highest of among all
age groups.
Next, we explore alternative definitions of the saving rate. In Figure 5, we now exclude durables
from the definition of consumption. Durable goods can indeed be considered as investments rather
than consumption expenditures and methodological papers sometimes recommend excluding them
from consumption when computed saving rates. As the Figure shows, the resulting age-profile are
similar to the benchmark case.
The next section builds a model to account for this high saving rate of young households.
4 Theoretical model
This section uses a simple life-cycle model to study how the low return on saving instruments in a
financially undeveloped economy can lead to large saving by young households. When the return
on saving instruments available in the financial system is low and borrowing constraints are strong,
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young households have an incentive to accumulate enough wealth so that they can buy real assets
with larger returns such as housing.
4.1 A simple framework
We start with a simple framework where we can study the mechanism in a transparent way. We
consider a life-cycle model where households live for three periods: young, middle age, and old,
indexed by t = 1, 2, 3. Households receive a labor income in their young and middle age, but not
in their old age. We assume an institutional setting characterized by an undeveloped financial
system, with a lack of saving instruments providing a good rate of return, so that households use
real assets as substitutes for financial assets. We model this institutional setting with the three
following assumptions:
1. There are strong borrowing constraints: households cannot borrow.
2. The financial system provides saving instruments D (henceforth deposits), with a low gross
rate of return r.
3. At t = 2, households can also buy a real asset A with a larger rate of return R > r, but
subject to a minimum investment requirement A.
Our approach is partial equilibrium and we take the rate of returns r and R as exogenous.
As we will see, these assumptions are enough to generate large saving when young. As in a
standard life-cycle model, households want to transfer consumption from their middle age to their
old age, but are limited by the low rate of return on deposits. To benefit from the higher rate
of return on the real asset, households have to save enough when young to meet the minimum
investment requirement in their middle age.
Section 4.2 below shows that this simple framework can be derived from a more realistic set-up
with housing and mortgages.
Consider a household that derives utility from consumption:
U = u(C1) + βu(C2) + β2u(C3). (1)
To get closed-form solutions, we study the case of a logarithmic utility function: u(Ct) = log(Ct).
The household enters the economy with wealth rD0. It receives labor income Y at t = 1 and
gY at t = 2. Denote Dt the deposits bought in period t and A2 the real assets bought at t = 2.
The budget constraints at t = 1, 2, 3 are:
rD0 + Y = C1 +D1, (2)
rD1 + gY = C2 +D2 + ζ2A2, (3)
rD2 +Rζ2A2 = C3, (4)
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where ζt = 1 if the household buys the real asset at t and 0 otherwise.
The household faces borrowing constraints and a minimum investment requirement for the real
asset:
D1 ≥ 0, (5)
D2 ≥ 0, (6)
A2 ≥ A. (7)
An optimal plan is a set of {Ct}3t=1, {Dt}2t=1, A2, and ζ2 that maximizes the utility (1) subject
to the budget constraints (2), (3), and (4), the borrowing constraints (5) and (6) and the minimum
investment requirement (7).
Define W = Y (1 + rd0 + g/r) the intertemporal wealth of the household. We use lower-case
letters to denote variables normalized by first-period labor income: d0 = D0/Y , d1 = D1/Y ,
w = W/Y , a2 = A2/Y , a = A/Y , etc.
To restrict the set of possible solutions, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. g ≤ βr(1 + β)(1 + rd0).
This assumption makes sure the household has non-negative net assets at the end of the first
period.
4.2 Housing and mortgages
This subsection shows how the simple framework described above can be derived from a more
realistic set-up with housing and mortgages.
Assume consumption consists of both goods CG and housing services CH , with a Cobb-Douglas
aggregate: Ct = κ(CGt )
1−η(CHt )η. The aggregate consumption basket C is chosen as the numeraire.
Denote pG the price of goods and ρ the rental price. We have Ct = pGt C
G
t + ρtC
H
t .
Households get housing services either by buying a home, with price pH , or renting it: CHt =
ζt−1Ht−1+Xt, where Ht−1 is the stock of housing bought in the previous period, Xt denotes housing
services derived from renting, and ζt = 1 if the household buys housing at t and 0 otherwise.3
We assume, as in Gervais (2002), that housing is not perfectly divisible: houses have a min-
imum size H. This constrains a household wishing to buy a house. On the contrary, renting an
accommodation is not subject to this indivisibility as several households can share the same house.
Houses depreciate at rate δ.
Households can use their house as collateral to get a mortgage from a bank. Mortgages are
subject to a maximum loan-to-value ratio γ: a household must make a down payment representing
at least a fraction 1−γ of the value of the house. Denote Rm the gross rate of return on a mortgage.
3Xt can be negative if the household rents some of its house or apartment to another household.
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Denote Bt the mortgage issued in period t. The budget constraint at time t is:
rDt−1 + pHt (1− δ)ζt−1Ht−1 +Bt + Yt = pGt CGt + ρtXt +RmBt−1 + pHt ζtHt +Dt. (8)
In addition to the non-negativity constraints on Dt, (5) and (6), the household is now subject to
borrowing constraints and the indivisibility of houses:
Bt ≤ γptHt, (9)
Ht ≥ H. (10)
Define the rate of return on housing RHt = [(1 − δ)pHt + ρt]/pHt−1. Using the fact that CHt =
ζt−1Ht−1 +Xt and that pGt CGt + ρtCHt = Ct, we can rewrite the budget constraint (8) as follows:
rDt−1 + (RHt −Rm)pHt−1ζt−1Ht−1 +Rm(pHt−1ζt−1Ht−1 −Bt−1) + Yt = Ct + (pHt ζtHt −Bt) +Dt.
We can consolidate the borrowing constraint (9) and the indivisibility constraint (10) in a minimum
investment requirement in housing equity:
pHt Ht −Bt ≥ (1− γ)pHt H.
Assume banks arbitrage away any difference between the return on housing and the mortgage
rate. Then, RHt = R
m, and the only housing-related term that matters in the budget constraint
is housing equity pHt Ht − Bt. If, on the contrary, because of market imperfections, RHt > Rm,
then any household that chooses to invest in housing will leverage up as much as possible so that
the value of housing will be a multiple 1/(1− γ) of housing equity. In both cases, the household’s
problem reduces to the model exposed in section 4.1 where the real asset is housing equity:
At = pHt Ht −Bt,
R =
RHt+1 −Rm
1− γ +R
m,
At = (1− γ)pHt H.
When the real asset is housing equity, the minimum investment requirement increases with the
price of housing pHt and decreases with the maximum loan-to-value ratio (i.e. increases with the
intensity of the borrowing constraint on the mortgage market).
4.3 Discussion of the set-up
We think the simple set-up presented in section 4.1, although highly stylized, captures some key
features of the Chinese economy. First, Chinese households have limited access to credit, as in our
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model. Second, they have a limited choice of saving instruments, which mainly consist of deposits.
The interest rate on deposits is notoriously low, in part due to the policy of setting a ceiling for
deposit rates (Laurens and Maino 2007, Green 2005). With strict capital controls, households do
not have access to foreign financial markets where they might benefit from higher returns.4 On the
contrary, the rate of return on housing has been large, due to substantial increases in real estate
prices over the last years.
In the model, we take both rates of return, on deposits (r) and housing equity R, as exogenous.
The rate on deposits is regulated by the government and is therefore set exogenously. As for the
return on housing equity, it depends on equilibrium on this market and is exogenous to a single
household, our unit of analysis.
In section 4.2, we interpret the real asset as an equity share in housing. Several authors have
argued that the need to buy a house, together with borrowing constraints, might generate strong
savings for young households in order to finance the required down-payment. The decision to buy
a home is generally presented as exogenous (e.g. Wang and Wen, 2012). A shortcoming of this
argument is that households have the possibility to rent a home instead of buying it. In our model,
the decision to buy a home is endogenous. As we will show, this dramatically changes the results
as it destroys the link between housing and saving. To recover this link, it is necessary to assume
a wedge between the rate of return of housing and that of financial instrument such as deposits.
To simplify the exposition, we have assumed that households can only buy the real asset at
t = 2. Assuming they can buy it at t = 1 would not change the results, but would generate more
cases. The fact that households can only buy a house in their second period of life is also consistent
with our data: Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of home purchase age in the 2002 and 2007
surveys, with a mode at 42 in 2002 and 33 in 2007.
4.4 Understanding high saving from young households
We now solve for the optimal plan in the simple setting of section 4.1.
Consider first the case when the rates of return on deposits and real assets are equal: r = R.
Then, both assets are perfect substitutes. In that case, the minimum investment requirement a
(and therefore the price of housing) does not have any impact on saving behavior: if a household
cannot meet the minimum requirement at t = 2, it will simply buy deposits instead, without any
loss on utility.
The following Proposition derives saving in both periods in the case r = R.
Proposition 1. If r = R, the demand for deposits and real assets are given by d1 = s∗1 and
4Bacchetta, Benhima, and Kalantzis (2012) show that it can be optimal for the government to implement capital
controls and let the interest rate on saving deviate from the world interest rate. However, they argue that in the case
of China, the government should choose a domestic interest rate on deposits higher than the world rate, not lower.
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d2 + ζ2a2 = s∗2, where
s∗1 =
β(1 + β)(1 + rd0)− gr
1 + β + β2
, s∗2 =
β2[r(1 + rd0) + g]
1 + β + β2
.
If s∗2 ≤ a, asset holdings s∗2 only consist of deposits, otherwise the distribution of assets between
deposits and real assets is undetermined.
Proof. See Appendix 7.2.
When r = R, the saving behavior is entirely driven by the life-cycle motive. A steeper income
profile between the first and second period of life (a higher g), leads to lower saving when young
and larger saving when middle-aged, i.e. to a more pronounced inverted-U shape.
Corollary 1. When r = R and the real asset is housing equity as in section 4.2, saving from young
households is independent of housing prices pH .
The absence of link between housing prices and saving when r = R comes from the fact that
households are free to choose between owning and renting a home. When housing prices are high
enough, the required down payment to buy a home exceeds saving in the second period. Then,
households are not willing to deviate from the saving profile corresponding to the life-cycle motive.
They prefer to rent a home instead.
Consider now the case of a low return on saving instruments r < R. Then, the real asset
strictly dominates deposits. Suppose the household is rich enough to meet the minimum investment
requirement (7). Then, the household buys deposits d1 = s∗1 at t = 1 and invests all its saving in
the real asset at t = 2, with a2 = s∗2. Call this a plan of type (a).
Note that the amount of assets purchased in the second period, s∗2, increases with the intertem-
poral wealth w = (1 + rd0) + g/r. Suppose now that the household has a lower intertemporal
wealth, such that s∗2 < a. Then, it cannot invest in the real assets without distorting its saving
profile. There are two possibilities. The household can choose to distort its saving profile to buy
the minimum amount of real assets a at t = 2. This requires reducing consumption both at t = 2,
but also at t = 1 since the household tries to smooth consumption. We refer to this as a type-(b)
plan. Or the household can just invest in deposits at t = 1 and t = 2, without buying the real
asset, which we refer to as a type-(c) plan. The terms of the trade-off are the following: by choosing
a type-(b) plan, the households reaps the benefits of the higher return of the real asset between
periods 2 and 3, but suffers from the disutility of distorting its consumption-saving profile.
The following Proposition shows that households with a large enough intertemporal wealth
choose a type (a) plan, while households with an intermediary wealth choose a type (b) plan, and
households with a low enough wealth choose a type (c) plan.
Proposition 2. There is a function ϕ strictly decreasing on [1,+∞), with ϕ(1) = 1+β+β2
β2
, limx→+∞ ϕ(x) =
1, and such that:
12
• For an intertemporal wealth w ≥ a
r
ϕ(1), the household chooses the type-(a) plan with da1 = s
∗
1,
da2 = 0, and a
a
2 = s
∗
2 > a.
• For a
r
ϕ
(
R
r
) ≤ w < a
r
ϕ(1), the household chooses the type-(b) plan with
db1 =
β(1 + rd0)− g−ar
1 + β
> s∗1,
db2 = 0, and a
b
2 = a.
• For w < a
r
ϕ
(
R
r
)
, the household chooses the type-(c) plan with dc1 = s
∗
1, d
c
2 = s
∗
2, and a
c
2 = 0.
In addition, the difference between deposits d1 in plans of type (b) and (a), db1 − da1 increases with
a and decreases with w.
Proof. See Appendix 7.2.
A household with an intermediate level of intertemporal wealth finds it optimal to save a larger
fraction of its income when young. This way, the household accumulates enough wealth to meet
the minimum investment requirement in its middle age, and benefits from the larger return of the
real asset when old.
Figure 3 plots the saving of the young household D1/Y as a function of the minimum investment
requirement A/Y . For households that choose plans of type (b) (middle segment of Figure 3), the
proposition predicts that a higher value of a = A/Y leads to more saving in their young age (db1
increases with a). For “rich” or “poor” households, saving does not depend of A/Y .
In the second period, saving of households choosing type-(b) plans is given by a− db1 which can
be shown to be also increasing in a when r(1 + β) > 1, a plausible assumption. Finally, in their
third period, households dissave. Their saving is equal to −A, with a saving rate equal to 1/(R−1)
independent of a.
If we interpret the real asset as an equity share in housing, as in section 4.2, the minimum
investment requirement A is an increasing function of the price of housing. Therefore, the model
shows how a higher price of housing can lead to more saving by young households with an interme-
diate level of intertemporal wealth. On the contrary, for rich households with type-(a) plans and
poor households with type-(c) plans, the price of housing should not have any effect on saving.
This leads to testable empirical implications. Consider a household with a type-(b) plan, i.e. a
household with an intermediate level of intertemporal wealth. According to the model, we expect
the saving rate of this household to be negatively correlated with the income-price ratio when
young (increasing with the housing price and decreasing with the income). On the contrary, for
rich households, the saving rate in the young and middle age should not be correlated with the
income-price ratio.
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5 Empirical Results
This section presents empirical evidence on the relation between household savings and housing
prices, using as a guide insights from the theoretical model outlined in Section 4.
Our identification strategy consists in exploiting both the geographical and household dimen-
sions of the data. We compare households with different shares of young members facing different
real estate prices in provincial real estate markets. Consider households with similar characteristics
except regarding their share of young members and the price of housing in their province. The
mechanism described in the model implies that the difference in the saving rate of households with
a larger share of young members and households with a lower share of young members, should be
higher in provincial real estate markets with a higher housing price.
More specifically, our baseline specification is the following:
si,t = ai,t
yi,t
pHj,t
+ bi,t log(yi,t) + ci,tshare20−30i,t + di,tshare
30−40
i,t
+ ei,t
yi,t
pHj,t
× share20−30i,t + fi,t
yi,t
pHj,t
× share30−40i,t + gi,t log(yi,t)× share20−30i,t + hi,t log(yi,t)× share30−40i,t
+Kij,tcontrolsij,t + i,t (11)
where i denotes a household, j a province, and t a date. The variable si,t denotes the saving rate
of household i in year t, yi,t its net income, share20−30i,t (share
30−40
i,t ) its share of members aged
between 20 and 30 (30 and 40), and pHj,t denotes the average price of housing in province j and
date t. As explained in Section 4, the relevant variable to capture the effect of housing on saving is
the income-price ratio yi,t
pHj,t
. Our identification strategy focuses on the interactions yi,t
pHj,t
× share20−30i,t
and yi,t
pHj,t
× share30−40i,t . If the mechanism of the model is present in the data, the corresponding
coefficients should be negative. This identification strategy should address concerns that provincial
housing prices might be correlated with other variables likely to affect the saving rate. It assumes
that the reaction of saving rates to those omitted variables is the same across households with
different shares of young members.
The data consists of repeated cross-sections for the years 1995, 2002, and 2007. We compute
the average provincial housing price using the value of homes per square meter for households
owning their home.5 There are between 11 and 16 provinces in the sample, depending on years
(see Table 9 in the Appendix). To avoid extreme values of the saving rate, we exclude the top
and bottom 0.5% values for this variable. For the years 2002 and 2007, we use population-based
weights to correct for the fact that the sample sizes are not proportional to regional or provincial
5In the CHIP survey households were asked to estimate the market value of their housing. These self-reported
housing values and self-reported housing areas are used to calculate each household’s housing price per square meter,
and then the provincial average housing price per square meter.
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populations.6 Importantly, we control for the household income, both directly and interacted with
the share of young members. This should capture the cross-sectional variation coming from the
numerator of the income-price ratio and make sure that our results are driven by housing prices.
A potential issue with our methodology is that we cannot control for provincial fixed effects. To
address this issue, we include among controls several variables aggregated at the provincial level.
The baseline regression includes average provincial income and consumption as control variables.
We experiment with other variables in robustness checks later. Descriptive statistics of the main
variables used in the regressions are presented in Table 10 of the Appendix.
5.1 Baseline specification
Table 1 presents a first set of results for this baseline specification. The dependent variable is
the saving rate of each of the households in the dataset. Columns (1), (4), and (7) present a
benchmark regression which only includes control variables. Columns (2), (5), and (8) add the
variables of interest, i.e. the income-price ratio y/pH and the share of young households share20−30
and share30−40 . Finally, columns (3), (6), and (9) add the interaction terms described above. For
each coefficient, p-values are reported in brackets.
Control variables include age dummies, the size of the household (in log), the number of gen-
erations in the household, and the household income and gross wealth (in log)7. Unfortunately,
the 2007 survey does not report total wealth any more. For that year, we used the value of hous-
ing as a proxy for gross wealth for households owning their home and set the variable to zero
for renters. As explained above, we also control for the average income and consumption of the
province. Among variables with statistically significant coefficients at conventional levels, age dum-
mies capture the age-profile described in Section 3, the household size (number of generations) is
negatively (positively) correlated with saving rates, and the effect of household income is positive:
richer households save comparatively more. As for provincial average income and consumption,
households in richer cities tend to have a higher saving rate but the average city consumption has
a negative sign. A likely explanation of the latter is that prices are higher in cities with a high
average (nominal) consumption, and therefore households save less in these areas, conditional on
their nominal income.
In columns (2), (5), and (8), the income-price ratio has a negative sign, as predicted in the the-
oretical framework of Section 4: higher house prices, for a given income level (and therefore a lower
income-price ratio), are associated with higher household saving. The coefficient is statistically
significant at 1% for 1995 and 2002, but not for 2007.
Finally, columns (3), (6), and (9) present the full regression. The coefficient of the interaction
6Weights were not available for 1995.
7Gross wealth is defined as the sum of total financial assets, durable goods value, house value, fixed assets and
other assets
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Table 1: Baseline regressions
1995 2002 2007
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) ( 8 ) ( 9 )
(Intercept) 2.45 3.15 2.94 1.3 1.86 1.82 1.51 1.6 1.54
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Age 30-34 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06
[0.1] [0.96] [0.83] [0.88] [0.43] [0.4] [0.07] [0.00] [0.01]
Age 35-39 -0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07
[0.09] [0.7] [0.54] [0.24] [0.07] [0.05] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00]
Age 40-44 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.1 -0.09 -0.09
[0.00] [0.24] [0.38] [0.01] [0.03] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Age 45-49 -0.11 -0.06 -0.05 -0.1 -0.09 -0.1 -0.12 -0.1 -0.1
[0.00] [0.04] [0.09] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Age 50-54 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04
[0.00] [0.2] [0.37] [0.02] [0.04] [0.03] [0.00] [0.02] [0.02]
Age 55-59 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02
[0.31] [0.66] [0.45] [0.49] [0.43] [0.46] [0.04] [0.17] [0.23]
Age 60-64 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0
[0.69] [0.07] [0.05] [0.4] [0.37] [0.37] [0.46] [0.8] [0.96]
Age 65-69 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.11 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04
[0.79] [0.1] [0.07] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.06] [0.1]
Log(size) 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
[0.81] [0.65] [0.93] [0.04] [0.05] [0.1] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
# of generations -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
[0.07] [0.13] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.12] [0.04] [0.06] [0.09]
Log(income) 0.22 0.29 0.23 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.16
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Log(gross wealth) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.44] [0.43] [0.42] [0.94] [0.86] [0.75] [0.93] [0.87] [0.78]
Log(avg prov. income) 0.83 0.48 0.57 0.54 0.51 0.51 0.61 0.59 0.59
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Log(avg prov. consumption) -1.08 -0.81 -0.87 -0.66 -0.68 -0.68 -0.74 -0.73 -0.73
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
y
pH
-47.13 -34.83 -9.18 -8 -2.33 -1.37
[0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.01] [0.24] [0.5]
share20−30 0.1 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.06
[0.00] [0.00] [0.72] [0.81] [0.03] [0.02]
share30−40 0 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.1 0.1
[0.91] [0.84] [0.06] [0.07] [0.00] [0.00]
Log(income) × share20−30 0.11 -0.09 0.06
[0.06] [0.19] [0.2]
Log(income) × share30−40 0.12 -0.11 -0.07
[0.01] [0.03] [0.01]
y
pH
× share20−30 -141.93 -23.52 -20.04
[0.00] [0.12] [0.03]
y
pH
× share30−40 -20.04 -16.22 -0.11
[0.53] [0.15] [0.99]
R2 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.09
adj.R2 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09
N 6583 6583 6583 6431 6431 6431 9155 9155 9155
p-values in brackets
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term yi,t
pHj,t
× share20−30i,t is negative for all three years, consistent with the identification strategy.
It is statistically significant at the 5% level for 1995 and 2002. The estimation is somewhat less
accurate for 2002 with a p-value of 12%. The coefficients of the yi,t
pHj,t
× share30−40i,t are negative
but have very larger standard errors and cannot be distinguished from 0 at conventional levels
of statistical significance. Overall, our baseline regressions lend support to the existence of a link
between housing prices and saving, in line with the mechanism highlighted in the theoretical section
of this paper.
5.2 Non-linearity of the link between housing prices and saving
To test the prediction that the main effect of the model should disappear for rich households (who
do not face the same financial constraint), we run regressions on subsets defined by wealth quartiles
(Tables 2 to 4). For 1995, the coefficient of the interaction term yi,t
pHj,t
× share20−30i,t gets its large
value in absolute value term in the second quartile. For both 2002 and 2007, the interaction term is
only statistically significant in the first quartile (at the 10% for 2002 and 5% level for 2007). These
results confirm the non-linearity predicted by the model. The result for 2007 should however be
taken with caution: as explained above, gross wealth for the year is proxied by housing wealth.
To get a sense of the magnitude of the effect, consider the first quartile of 2002. The estimated
coefficient is -88, for an average income-price ratio equal to 3.3×10−3. Other things equal, a housing
prices that are 20% higher should reduce the ratio by 0.610−3, which would mean the saving rate
of a young individual aged 20 to 30 would be 5 percentage points higher. Similarly, housing prices
that are 50% higher would be associated with a saving rate for this age of individual that is 10
percentage points higher.
5.3 Robustness checks
Finally, tables 5 to 7 present a set of alternative specifications to check the robustness and valid-
ity of our main results. For convenience, the baseline specification is reproduced in column (1).
Column (2) replaces the age dummy variables by a continuous measure of age and its square. In
column (3), we control for the competitive saving motive of Wei and Zhang (2011). We add dummy
variables indicating whether there is a son in the household and whether the household consists of
a single young man, the provincial sex ratio and its interactions with the former dummy variables.
Column (4) controls for the education of the top income member, and column (5) for its marital
status. Overall, the coefficients of interest are remarkably stable throughout. In column (6), we
use an alternative definition of the saving rate where we exclude expenditures on durables from the
definition of consumption. Finally, column (7) uses the number of young members in the household
instead of the share.
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Table 2: Regressions on subsets defined by wealth quartiles for 1995
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 )
All sample Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(Intercept) 2.94 2.28 2.77 3.72 3.6
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Age 30-34 0.01 0.08 0.02 -0.06 -0.02
[0.83] [0.19] [0.76] [0.35] [0.74]
Age 35-39 0.02 0.09 0.01 -0.06 0.04
[0.54] [0.21] [0.87] [0.35] [0.63]
Age 40-44 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04
[0.38] [0.96] [0.89] [0.28] [0.52]
Age 45-49 -0.05 0.00 -0.08 -0.09 -0.04
[0.09] [0.95] [0.21] [0.13] [0.54]
Age 50-54 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 0.03
[0.37] [0.57] [0.61] [0.21] [0.68]
Age 55-59 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.06
[0.45] [0.64] [0.71] [0.85] [0.36]
Age 60-64 0.06 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.04
[0.05] [0.05] [0.56] [0.59] [0.52]
Age 65-69 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.09
[0.07] [0.41] [0.32] [0.47] [0.24]
Log(size) 0.00 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 0.1
[0.93] [0.21] [0.81] [0.92] [0.17]
# of generations -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06
[0.08] [0.64] [0.59] [0.46] [0.08]
Log(income) 0.23 0.3 0.15 0.29 0.24
[0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00]
Log(gross wealth) 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01
[0.42] [0.48] [0.9] [0.4] [0.6]
Log(avg prov. income) 0.57 0.2 1.43 0.46 0.11
[0.00] [0.52] [0.00] [0.18] [0.79]
Log(avg prov. consumption) -0.87 -0.44 -1.7 -0.8 -0.48
[0.00] [0.1] [0.00] [0.01] [0.19]
y
pH
-34.83 -45.49 -8.98 -32.38 -72.18
[0.03] [0.20] [0.82] [0.32] [0.03]
share20−30 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.06 0.08
[0.00] [0.02] [0.10] [0.32] [0.28]
share30−40 0.01 -0.08 -0.01 0.11 -0.04
[0.84] [0.24] [0.93] [0.08] [0.55]
Log(income) × share20−30 0.11 0.02 0.3 -0.04 0.23
[0.06] [0.88] [0.05] [0.74] [0.07]
Log(income) × share30−40 0.12 -0.09 0.19 -0.02 0.34
[0.01] [0.4] [0.07] [0.82] [0.00]
y
pH
× share20−30 -141.93 -45.94 -224.05 -102.7 -183.19
[0.00] [0.68] [0.02] [0.15] [0.01]
y
pH
× share30−40 -20.04 82.5 -21.17 -48.65 -44.36
[0.53] [0.28] [0.76] [0.41] [0.47]
R2 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09
adj.R2 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08
N 6583 1620 1672 1640 1643
p-values in brackets
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Table 3: Regressions on subsets defined by wealth quartiles for 2002
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 )
All sample Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(Intercept) 1.82 1.97 1.38 2.61 1.83
[0.00] [0.02] [0.16] [0.01] [0.01]
Age 30-34 -0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.06
[0.4] [0.91] [0.38] [0.98] [0.36]
Age 35-39 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.1
[0.05] [0.52] [0.28] [0.57] [0.15]
Age 40-44 -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.04 -0.07
[0.02] [0.34] [0.12] [0.44] [0.18]
Age 45-49 -0.1 -0.1 -0.11 -0.07 -0.12
[0.00] [0.07] [0.03] [0.2] [0.01]
Age 50-54 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.11
[0.03] [0.59] [0.39] [0.92] [0.02]
Age 55-59 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.08 -0.01
[0.46] [0.96] [0.71] [0.14] [0.9]
Age 60-64 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.09 -0.12
[0.37] [0.26] [0.34] [0.23] [0.1]
Age 65-69 0.11 0.1 0.14 0.13 0.08
[0.00] [0.21] [0.09] [0.09] [0.32]
Log(size) -0.06 -0.21 0.09 0.05 -0.11
[0.1] [0.00] [0.21] [0.45] [0.17]
# of generations 0.03 0.12 -0.01 -0.06 0.04
[0.12] [0.00] [0.7] [0.1] [0.33]
Log(income) 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.31 0.21
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
Log(gross wealth) 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.01
[0.75] [0.8] [0.73] [0.71] [0.55]
Log(avg prov. income) 0.51 0.56 0.52 0.26 0.59
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04] [0.00]
Log(avg prov. consumption) -0.68 -0.75 -0.68 -0.49 -0.78
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
y
pH
-8 -14.49 -2.67 -15.56 -10.14
[0.01] [0.18] [0.78] [0.03] [0.03]
share20−30 0.01 -0.08 -0.09 0.08 -0.08
[0.81] [0.40] [0.27] [0.34] [0.45]
share30−40 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.1
[0.07] [0.32] [0.40] [0.35] [0.31]
Log(income) × share20−30 -0.09 -0.11 -0.32 -0.37 0.16
[0.19] [0.56] [0.16] [0.05] [0.29]
Log(income) × share30−40 -0.11 0.02 -0.07 -0.34 -0.08
[0.03] [0.89] [0.61] [0.01] [0.52]
y
pH
× share20−30 -23.52 -87.79 49.03 -2.87 -31.48
[0.12] [0.08] [0.3] [0.93] [0.14]
y
pH
× share30−40 -16.22 -23.4 -35.29 22.19 -28.81
[0.15] [0.55] [0.26] [0.29] [0.1]
R2 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.08
adj.R2 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.07
N 6431 1602 1629 1606 1594
p-values in brackets
19
Table 4: Regressions on subsets defined by wealth quartiles for 2007
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 )
All sample Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(Intercept) 1.54 0.59 1.37 2.02 3.11
[0.00] [0.14] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
Age 30-34 -0.06 -0.06 0.01 -0.15 0.00
[0.01] [0.15] [0.86] [0.00] [0.96]
Age 35-39 -0.07 -0.08 -0.02 -0.15 0.02
[0.00] [0.07] [0.68] [0.00] [0.67]
Age 40-44 -0.09 -0.1 -0.05 -0.13 -0.02
[0.00] [0.01] [0.21] [0.00] [0.69]
Age 45-49 -0.1 -0.17 -0.01 -0.13 -0.06
[0.00] [0.00] [0.88] [0.00] [0.18]
Age 50-54 -0.04 -0.05 0.01 -0.09 0.02
[0.02] [0.18] [0.74] [0.01] [0.68]
Age 55-59 -0.02 -0.04 0.07 -0.1 0.02
[0.23] [0.32] [0.08] [0.01] [0.73]
Age 60-64 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.1
[0.96] [0.9] [0.58] [0.14] [0.03]
Age 65-69 -0.04 -0.05 0.01 -0.1 0.05
[0.1] [0.29] [0.88] [0.04] [0.3]
Log(size) -0.06 -0.09 -0.15 -0.02 -0.12
[0.01] [0.02] [0.00] [0.73] [0.03]
# of generations 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03
[0.09] [0.37] [0.43] [0.6] [0.23]
Log(income) 0.16 0.12 0.21 0.19 0.21
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Log(gross wealth) 0.00 0 -0.1 -0.02 -0.09
[0.78] [0.00] [0.00] [0.48] [0.00]
Log(avg prov. income) 0.59 0.54 0.7 0.7 0.48
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Log(avg prov. consumption) -0.73 -0.58 -0.72 -0.86 -0.66
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
y
pH
-1.37 7.39 -3.69 -1.27 -11.64
[0.5] [0.16] [0.44] [0.74] [0.00]
share20−30 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.05 -0.04
[0.02] [0.13] [0.12] [0.31] [0.60]
share30−40 0.1 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.16
[0.00] [0.02] [0.07] [0.00] [0.01]
Log(income) × share20−30 0.06 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.19
[0.2] [0.07] [0.98] [0.87] [0.06]
Log(income) × share30−40 -0.07 0.04 0.02 -0.2 -0.22
[0.01] [0.55] [0.85] [0.00] [0.00]
y
pH
× share20−30 -20.04 -53.62 -31.79 -1.31 -20.69
[0.03] [0.02] [0.2] [0.95] [0.19]
y
pH
× share30−40 -0.11 -38.33 3.6 11.46 24.12
[0.99] [0.03] [0.84] [0.33] [0.02]
R2 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.08
adj.R2 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.07
N 9155 2292 2309 2349 2067
p-values in brackets
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To summarize our results, we find support in the data for a housing price effect on saving
behavior: households with young members aged 20 to 30 tend to save more when they face a larger
price of housing relative to their income. The estimated coefficient is statistically significant at
conventional levels for 1995 and 2007, but the estimation is less accurate for 2002, where statistical
significance just falls short of the 10% level. This effect seems to display some non-linearity, as
predicted by the model: for all three years, we find a statistically significant coefficient for lower
levels of wealth. We do not find a similar effect for young members aged 30 to 40.
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Table 5: Robustness checks for 1995
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 )
Log(income) 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.24
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
y
pH
-34.83 -36.15 -36.53 -35.21 -39.07 -30.47 -31.42
[0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.06]
share20−30 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.08
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
share30−40 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
[0.84] [0.01] [0.85] [0.74] [0.67] [0.90]
Log(income) × share20−30 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.08
[0.06] [0.07] [0.05] [0.06] [0.11] [0.11]
Log(income) × share30−40 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.09
[0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
y
pH
× share20−30 -141.93 -144.38 -142.89 -142.58 -137.09 -119.57
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
y
pH
× share30−40 -20.04 -18.79 -22.84 -20.54 -16.07 -15.5
[0.53] [0.55] [0.48] [0.52] [0.62] [0.57]
Age dummies yes no yes yes yes yes yes
Age -0.01
[0.00]
Age2 0.00
[0.00]
Household with son -0.15
[0.64]
Prov. sex ratio -0.35
[0.11]
Single young man -0.18
[0.68]
Household with son × sex ratio 0.17
[0.6]
Single young man × sex ratio 0.18
[0.68]
Secondary education 0.03
[0.00]
Tertiary education -0.03
[0.13]
Married -0.12
[0.06]
Single -0.04
[0.56]
Widow 0.12
[0.62]
Number 20-30 0.04
[0.00]
Number 30-40 0.01
[0.36]
Log(income) x number 20-30 0.02
[0.29]
Log(income) × number 30-40 0.03
[0.05]
y
pH
x number 20-30 -33.11
[0.00]
y
pH
x number 30-40 -5.92
[0.56]
R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.08
adj.R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.08
N 6583 6861 6583 6583 6464 6583 6583
p-values in brackets
Note: The regressions also control for the size of the household, the number of generations, wealth, and
average provincial income and consumption. In column (6), an alternative definition is used for the saving
rate, where education expenditures are excluded from consumption.
Table 6: Robustness checks for 2002
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 )
Log(income) 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.2 0.19
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
y
pH
-8 -8.61 -10.71 -8.08 -8.13 -4.11 -7.59
[0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.10] [0.02]
share20−30 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
[0.81] [0.50] [0.94] [0.76] [0.59] [0.42]
share30−40 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.1 0.08
[0.07] [0.00] [0.05] [0.06] [0.02] [0.02]
Log(income) × share20−30 -0.09 -0.05 -0.11 -0.09 -0.11 -0.13
[0.19] [0.44] [0.14] [0.19] [0.12] [0.01]
Log(income) × share30−40 -0.11 -0.09 -0.13 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11
[0.03] [0.08] [0.01] [0.03] [0.02] [0.01]
y
pH
× share20−30 -23.52 -19.94 -19.81 -23.36 -21.47 11.36
[0.12] [0.17] [0.19] [0.12] [0.16] [0.32]
y
pH
× share30−40 -16.22 -16.13 -13.52 -15.42 -14.68 -3.18
[0.15] [0.15] [0.23] [0.17] [0.19] [0.71]
Age dummies yes no yes yes yes yes yes
Age -0.02
[0.00]
Age2 0.00
[0.00]
Household with son 1.05
[0.02]
Prov. sex ratio -0.39
[0.22]
Single young man -0.63
[0.24]
Household with son × sex ratio -1.09
[0.02]
Single young man × sex ratio 0.67
[0.23]
Secondary education -0.02
[0.52]
Tertiary education -0.06
[0.03]
Married -0.05
[0.22]
Single 0.04
[0.42]
Widow -0.02
[0.78]
Number 20-30 0.00
[0.96]
Number 30-40 0.04
[0.00]
Log(income) x number 20-30 -0.02
[0.25]
Log(income) × number 30-40 -0.03
[0.02]
y
pH
x number 20-30 -5.97
[0.16]
y
pH
x number 30-40 -2.6
[0.42]
R2 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.06
adj.R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.06
N 6431 6765 6431 6406 6406 6431 6431
p-values in brackets
Note: The regressions also control for the size of the household, the number of generations, wealth, and
average provincial income and consumption. In column (6), an alternative definition is used for the saving
rate, where education expenditures are excluded from consumption.
Table 7: Robustness checks for 2007
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 )
Log(income) 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
y
pH
-1.37 -1.57 -1.38 -1.47 -0.92 -3 -0.92
[0.50] [0.42] [0.49] [0.47] [0.65] [0.09] [0.66]
share20−30 0.06 0.1 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.04
[0.02] [0.00] [0.02] [0.03] [0.01] [0.06]
share30−40 0.1 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.08
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Log(income) × share20−30 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05
[0.2] [0.11] [0.17] [0.22] [0.19] [0.18]
Log(income) × share30−40 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.00]
y
pH
× share20−30 -20.04 -18.31 -20.76 -20.36 -19.72 -19.81
[0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02]
y
pH
× share30−40 -0.11 1.24 -0.17 -0.01 -0.19 0.83
[0.99] [0.84] [0.98] [1] [0.98] [0.88]
Age dummies yes no yes yes yes yes yes
Age -0.01
[0.00]
Age2 0.00
[0.00]
Household with son -0.22
[0.41]
Prov. sex ratio -0.08
[0.63]
Single young man 0.05
[0.88]
Household with son × sex ratio 0.21
[0.44]
Single young man × sex ratio -0.06
[0.85]
Secondary education -0.05
[0.00]
Tertiary education -0.08
[0.00]
Married -0.07
[0.00]
Single -0.16
[0.00]
Widow -0.11
[0.01]
Number 20-30 0.03
[0.00]
Number 30-40 0.03
[0.00]
Log(income) x number 20-30 0.01
[0.35]
Log(income) × number 30-40 -0.03
[0.00]
y
pH
x number 20-30 -5.82
[0.01]
y
pH
x number 30-40 1.19
[0.47]
R2 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
adj.R2 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
N 9155 9900 9155 9155 9154 9155 9155
p-values in brackets
Note: The regressions also control for the size of the household, the number of generations, wealth, and
average provincial income and consumption. In column (6), an alternative definition is used for the saving
rate, where education expenditures are excluded from consumption.
6 Conclusion
This paper has revisited the puzzle of the high savings rates of Chinese households, focusing on the
role of housing prices and borrowing constraints. Insights from a theoretical model suggest that for
financially constrained households (i.e. for households that face severe borrowing contraints and
need to make substantial downpayments for the purchase of their houses), higher house prices will
be associated with higher saving rates when the return on financial instruments is low compared to
that on real estate. We present key stylized facts and empirical results on Chinese household savings
rates, based on detailed micro data from the CHIP database. Regression results lend substantial
support to the model. We find in particular that higher house prices are indeed associated with
higher savings, ceteris paribus. This is especially the case in the age groups and the wealth levels
predicted by the model. The results were subjected to a battery of robustness tests, which confirmed
the main findings.
These results shed a new light on household savings in China, which have attracted much
attention in the policy and academic debate. They may be especially relevant now that the housing
sector in China is under intense scrutiny.
Our analysis, however, makes clear that the housing sector per se is not the cause of elevated
saving rates. Rather, we find that high saving rates result from the combined effect of high hous-
ing prices, borrowing constraints, and the absence of alternative savings instruments that yield
reasonable returns.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Data
Our empirical analysis uses urban household survey data from the 1995, 2002 and 2007 rounds of
the China Household Income Project (CHIP). Detailed explanation of the data can be found in
Eichen and Zhang (1993), Li et al. (2008), Luo et al. (2011), and Song et al. (2011). Here we
mention some features of the data relevant to our analysis.
The CHIP survey samples are subsamples of the NBS annual urban household survey sample.
The 1995 and 2002 CHIP urban samples cover 12 provinces; in 2007 the sample was expanded by
four additional provinces (Table 8).8 In all years the provinces were selected so as to cover China’s
major regions (East, Center, West, and municipalities with provincial status, which, due to their
distinctiveness, are treated as a separate regional category). The sample sizes are not proportional
to regional or provincial populations, and Song et al. (2011) therefore suggests use of population-
based weights. Song et al. (2011) use population information from China’s 2000 census and the
2005 population sample survey to develop weights for the 2002 and 2007 CHIP samples. We use
these weights in our analysis of the 2002 and 2007 data. For 1995 we do not use weights.
The CHIP datasets contain detailed information about household income and expenditures, as
well as other relevant individual and household variables. Some of this information is supplied to
CHIP by the NBS from its annual survey, and some of it is additional information collected using
a supplementary questionnaire designed by the CHIP research group. Information on household
income and expenditures, which we use to calculate household savings, are supplied by the NBS,
which collects them using household income and expenditure diaries.
8The provinces in the 1995 and 2002 CHIP surveys were Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Hubei,
Guangdong, Chongqing (included in Sichuan in 1995; separate province in 2002), Sichuan, Yunnan and Gansu. In
2007 Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Henan were added.
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Table 8: CHIP Urban Household Survey Samples
Provinces Households Individuals
1995 11 6934 21696
2002 12 6835 20632
2007 16 10000 29262
The NBS’s measure of urban disposable income (ke zhipei shouru), includes employee income
(wages, salaries and other compensation), net self-employment income, net property income, and
transfer income from public and private sources net of taxes and fees. Consumption expenditures
include household spending on food; clothing and footwear; household appliances; medical care and
health; transport and communications; recreational, educational, and cultural services; housing;
and other miscellaneous items.
Certain biases in the NBS urban survey sample are well known, and these are shared by the
CHIP sample. Informal rural-urban migrant households are not well represented. The sample is
largely composed of households that are long-term, formal urban residents with urban residence
permits (hukou). Rich households are also thought to be under-represented, and the degree of
under-representation has probably increased in recent years. With the growth of private businesses
and privately owned assets in China, and with the emergence of an ultra-rich segment of society, rich
households have become less willing to participate in the surveys, and households that participate
are more likely to underreport certain types of income. The resulting “grey” income question has
been the subject of some discussion recently (Wang and Woo 2011, Luo, Yue and Li 2011).
If the propensity to save of under-represented groups and out of grey income differs from that
of other groups and out of reported income, then the estimates of savings based on the NBS and
CHIP data will be biased (Kraay 2010). Chamon and Prasad (2011) examine the savings rates of
richer households in the NBS urban household survey and find that they do show higher propensity
to save. It is likely, therefore, that average savings rates calculated using the NBS urban survey
data are understated. We mention this issue, as it should inform the analysis and interpretation of
results.
Some researchers have noted problems with the NBS measure of disposable income. As discussed
in Khan et al. (1992), the NBS income measure does not include imputed rents on owner-occupied
housing. Excluding imputed rents will cause some overstatement of household savings rates (Ma
and Yi 2010). NBS income also does not include the value of consumption subsidies, although these
have been substantially reduced following the elimination of planned allocation of consumer goods
in the early 1990s and with the privatization of urban housing, which was basically completed by
the early 2000s. Subsidized rental housing continues for a small segment of urban households. In
our analysis we have used estimates of imputed rents developed by Sato et al. (2011) to compute
a measure of income that includes imputed rents, and we recalculate savings rates accordingly (to
30
recalculate savings rates, we include imputed rents in both income and consumption). Due to
lack of consistent information on consumption subsidies across years, our income variable does not
include such subsidies.
NBS income includes income received through cash-transfer programs, such as unemployment
insurance, pensions, and the minimum living guarantee program, but it does not include employer
contributions to pension and social insurance programs for employees. Also, it does not include
the value of subsidies implicit in social programs and public services such as education. Some
researchers (e.g., Li and Luo 2010) have argued that the market value of such programs should
be estimated and included as an income component. Due to difficulties in collecting the relevant
information and differing views about what should be included and how it should be computed, as
well as the fact that most international studies do not include such types of income, here we do not
include them. The exclusion of these income components may cause some underestimation of the
level of income and of savings.
7.2 Model: proofs of the Propositions
Consider the case r < R. We start by showing that optimal plans fall into the three categories
described in section 4.4: type (a), (b), or (c).
Denote λt the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint in period t (see equa-
tions (2)- (4)), γ2 the Lagrange multiplier associated to the minimum investment requirement (7),
and δ2 the Lagrange multiplier associated to the borrowing constraint at t = 2.9
The first-order conditions with respect to A2 and d2 are:
ζ2λ2 = ζ2βRλ3 + γ2,
λ2 = βrλ3 + δ2.
Suppose D2 = 0. The multiplier γ2 can be zero or strictly positive. If γ2 = 0, then, from (7),
we have A2 > A. This is a plan of type (a). If γ2 > 0, then the household invests exactly A2 = A
at t = 1. This is a plan of type (b). Suppose now D2 > 0, then δ2 = 0 and γ2 = ζ2β(r − R)λ3.
Since r < R, this implies γ2 = 0 and therefore ζ2 = 0. Then, the household does not invest in the
real asset. This is a plan of type (c).
Denote Ua, U b, U c, and da1, d
b
1, d
c
1, the utilities and first-period deposits associated to those
three types.
With logarithmic utility, it is straightforward to show that optimal plans of type (a) and (c)
9Assumption 1 makes sure that the optimal level of deposits d1 is non-negative. For notational convenience, we
discard the borrowing constraint at t = 1 (5).
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are characterized by the following demand for deposits:
da1 = d
c
1 = s
∗
1 =
β(1 + β)(1 + rd0)− gr
1 + β + β2
,
Aa2 = d
c
2 = s
∗
2 =
β2[r(1 + rd0) + g]
1 + β + β2
.
s∗1 is positive by assumption 1.
To be feasible, an optimal plan of type (a) requires that Ac2 > A. This condition can be rewritten
w > 1+β+β
2
β2
a
r .
An optimal plan of type (b) is characterized by the following demand for deposits:
db1 =
β(1 + rd0)− g−ar
1 + β
.
We have db1 > d
a
1, d
c
1 when w <
1+β+β2
β2
a
r .
For w < 1+β+β
2
β2
a
r , a plan of type (a) is not feasible, so the optimal plan has to be of type (a) or
(b). When the intertemporal wealth w approaches a from above, it can be shown that consumption
Cb1 in a type-(b) plan goes to 0, Then, utility U
b goes to −∞ and we have U b < U c. On the
contrary, when w = 1+β+β
2
β2
a
r , the type (b)-plan coincides with the type (a)-plan which dominates
the type (c)-plan because of the larger return on saving at t = 2. So, U b > Ua. Therefore, there
is a threshold w∗ ∈
(
a
r ,
[1+β+β2
β2
]a
r
)
such that Ua = U b when w = w∗, Ua > U b when w < w∗ and
Ua < U b when w > w∗. Replacing Cbt and Cct by their value in Ua = U b, we can show that the
threshold w∗ satisfies:
(1 + β + β2) logw∗ − (1 + β + β2)log(1 + β + β2) =
(1 + β) log
(
w∗ − a
r
)
+ β2 log
(a
r
R
r
)− (1 + β) log(1 + β)− β2 log(β2). (12)
This can be further simplified to
(
w∗
1 + β + β2
)1+β+β2
=
(
w∗ − ar
1 + β
)1+β ( a
r
R
r
β2
)β2
. (13)
Note that w∗ is homogeneous of degree 1 with respect to ar . We can therefore look for a solution
w∗ = ω ar . Equation (13) then simplifies to ψ 1+β+β2
β2
(ω) = Rr where ψu is defined by
ψu(x) =
x(1 + (x− 1)−1)u−1
u(1 + (u− 1)−1)u−1 .
The function ψu is continuous, differentiable and strictly decreasing on (1, u], with ψu(u) = 1 and
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limx→1 ψu(x) = +∞. Therefore, it has an inverse on that interval. Denote ϕ the inverse of ψ 1+β+β2
β2
defined on [1,+∞). The mapping ϕ has the properties stated in Proposition 2. The threshold is
then given by w∗ = arϕ
(
R
r
)
.
Finally, the difference db1 − da1 is given by:
db1 − da1 =
1
1 + β
[
a
r
− β
2
1 + β + β2
w
]
,
which increases with a and decreases with w.
This proves Proposition 2.
The proof of Proposition 1 is straightforward: when r = R, the set of intertemporal wealth w
such that arϕ
(
R
r
) ≤ w < arϕ(1) is empty and type (b) plans are impossible. In addition, deposits
and the real asset become perfect substitutes. Then, d1 = s∗1 and d2 + ζ2a2 = s∗2.
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7.3 Descriptive statistics
1995 2002 2007
Number of individuals 21726 20636 30340
Number of households 6931 6835 10000
Number of provinces 11 13 16
Table 9: General descriptive statistics
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Variable # First Quartile Mean Median Std Deviation Third Quartile
Saving rate 1995 6931 -0.296 -0.189 -0.090 0.605 0.079
Saving rate 2002 6835 -0.090 0.010 0.097 0.588 0.276
Saving rate 2007 10000 0.013 0.146 0.205 0.404 0.380
Saving rate (durables excl. from cons.) 1995 6931 -0.211 -0.107 -0.035 0.539 0.126
Saving rate (durables excl. from cons.) 2002 6835 -0.003 0.118 0.152 0.328 0.313
Saving rate (durables excl. from cons.) 2007 10000 0.066 0.202 0.242 0.339 0.405
Age of top income member 1995 6931 37.000 45.242 43.000 11.839 54.000
Age of top income member 2002 6835 37.000 44.785 44.000 11.202 51.000
Age of top income member 2007 10000 39.000 47.583 46.000 12.511 55.000
Share of age 20-30 1995 6931 0.000 0.128 0.000 0.213 0.250
Share of age 20-30 2002 6835 0.000 0.101 0.000 0.171 0.250
Share of age 20-30 2007 10000 0.000 0.110 0.000 0.181 0.333
Share of age 30-40 1995 6931 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.283 0.500
Share of age 30-40 2002 6835 0.000 0.169 0.000 0.258 0.333
Share of age 30-40 2007 10000 0.000 0.176 0.000 0.262 0.333
Income-price ratio 1995 6931 5.679 10.204 8.625 6.613 12.835
Income-price ratio 2002 6835 26.238 48.010 41.083 30.436 61.828
Income-price ratio 2007 10000 10.906 22.632 17.643 18.190 28.515
Province sex ratio 1995 6931 0.970 0.983 0.990 0.031 0.996
Province sex ratio 2002 6835 0.963 0.975 0.978 0.022 0.990
Province sex ratio 2007 10000 0.955 0.979 0.976 0.030 0.990
Income 1995 6931 9060.000 14072.281 12408.000 8094.421 16801.000
Income 2002 6835 14121.000 24058.299 20734.000 15108.310 29601.830
Income 2007 10000 26600.000 47874.254 39452.295 34298.772 58796.073
Gross wealth 1995 6931 10700.000 38040.598 23000.000 57808.805 45075.000
Gross wealth 2002 6835 30975.000 84204.178 58000.000 110939.838 102226.664
Gross wealth 2007 (proxy) 10000 25000.000 78711.389 50000.000 111214.095 100000.000
Province avg income 1995 6931 11781.082 14398.718 12996.085 4405.832 15849.212
Province avg income 2002 6835 19992.933 24622.886 21443.821 7444.149 26421.314
Province avg income 2007 10000 36851.245 49999.609 42057.876 16039.973 65177.959
Province avg consumption 1995 6931 13428.837 16256.617 14846.711 4707.770 17806.564
Province avg consumption 2002 6835 19279.240 23341.262 21936.925 5688.893 23239.282
Province avg consumption 2007 10000 31246.502 40125.269 35575.853 12438.105 49102.835
Table 10: Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regressions
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Figure 1: Distribution of home purchase age in 2002
Note: The dashed line indicates the mode of the distribution.
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Figure 2: Distribution of home purchase age in 2007
Note: The dashed line indicates the mode of the distribution.
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Figure 3: Saving of young household as a function of minimum investment requirement
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Figure 4: Average saving rate by age of top income member
Note: Solid line: 2007, dashed line: 2002, dotted line: 1995. Saving rates take into account imputed rents,
consumption includes durables and education expenses. The age relates to the household member with the
highest income. Averages are computed as a three-year moving average.
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Figure 5: Average saving rate by age of top income member (excluding durables from consumption)
Note: Solid line: 2007, dashed line: 2002, dotted line: 1995. Saving rates take into account
imputed rents, consumption excludes durables but includes education expenses. The age relates to
the household member with the highest income. Averages are computed as a three-year moving
average.
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